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FOUCAULT'S GENEALOGY OF
HOMOSEXUALITY
One Saturday aftemoon when I was twelve years old and bored,
I picked up a copy of my mother's Ladies' Horne Journal and began to
read. As usual, I carne across a word I did not know, so I trudged into the
kitchen and asked my mother: ttWhat is a homosexual?tt First she gave me
a look that let me know no dialogue on the subject could possibly ensue,
and then she gave me a one-sentence answer that, despite its
condemnatory tone, made no reference to sexual activity of any sorte I
wandered away, confused and deeply troubled.
Ten years later I picked up a copy of Michel Foucault's The
History 0/ Sexuality, Volume ]1 and began to read--at first with interest,
then wi'th enthusiasm, and finally with an excitement that intensified with
every turn of the page. I finished the book in oDe day. That eveniog at
a party I spoke of nothiog else, though I could not explain to anyone's
satisfaction why I was so taken with a 159-page book that made no
reference to sexual activity of any sorte
Another ten years have passed. It is now almost twenty-one years
since the brief exchange with my mother in the kitchen. In those
twenty-one years I have not suffered for lack of answers to my question:
"What is a homosexual?" Quite the contrary, I have suffered because of
the answers, under the weight of the answers, in the harsh light of the
answers, by being required to instantiate the answers.
A question, as Heidegger observed, opens ooto the world. There
are ways of answering questions that bring that opening to a sudden close,
and there are ways of answering--pursuing answers, pursuing the questions
themselves--that keep opening open, that keep possibility alive. My
excitement over Foucault's work arose from its approach to the question
of homosexuality, an approach that--unlike any other I had ever been
subjected to--did not halt thinking before it got underway. Though I could
not explain why, I knew the day I first read The History 0/ Sexuality that
I held in my hands a key to a kind of freedom.
This essay is a reading of The History 0/ Sexuality from the
perspective of the question, "What is a homosexual?tt It is an attempt to
offer an explanation for the excitement this book has held for me for over
IMichel Foucault, The History 0/ Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduct;on, trans. Robert
Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1978). Hereafter references to aod quotations from this
volume will be givien in the body of the text as HSI and page number.
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ten years. It is an attempt to show how Foucault's answers work to open
questioning and possibilities rather than to foreclose them, to show in what
ways Foucault's work is liberating, freeing. Most importantly, the essay
itself is a practice of freedom, in Foucault's sense. It is a practice of the
freedom Foucault's work produces as one undergoes the power of its
genealogical dispersions.
1. Foucault's Characteri%ation 0/ Sexual Subjectivity
In The History 0/ Sexuality, Volume 1, Foucault makes three
interrelated descriptive claims about contemporary sexuality. First, he
asserts that in the West at least since the nineteenth century, sexuality has
functioned as a sort of essence, as the name for what lies at tbe root of
any given human life and any given society; it is the foundation of
subjectivity. Sexuality is our most fundamental truth, and, as truth, it both
marks and occupies an epistemic field. For it is possible, theoretically at
least, to know the truth of sexuality, to take it as an epistemic object and
interrogate it.
Second, however, this power that pervades us, this essence that
grounds us singly and socially, this truth of our subjectivity is not under
our control. We do not choose our sexuality; on the contrary, it chooses
USo It shapes us, makes us who we are, and yet remains profoundly other
to our rationality and our civility. It thus poses a perpetual danger. We
must protect IOd nurture our sexuality, but we must also beware of it as
a force capable of destroying what it enables us to create. Hence, sexuality
becomes
an object of great suspicion; the general and disquieting meaning that
pervades our conduct and our existence, in spite of ourselves; the point
of weakness where evil portents reach through to us; the fragment of
darkness that we each carry within us: a general signification, a
universal secret, an omnipresent cause, a fear that never enc(HS1 69)
As the ground of meaning and even of our very existence, sexuality is to
be respected, but it is also to be feared.
Third, given that sexuality is our truth and that it endangers as
surely as it enables, sexuality not only can be taken as an object of
epistemic investigation; it must be so taken. Like nature itself, which both
engenders and destroys, sexuality must be understood. By whatever means
necessary, we must ensure that sexuality becomes known, that it steps into
the light of reason and, to the extent possible, submits itself to managerial
judgment. Sexuality, in the person of the sexual subject, must be brought
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to confess.
In short, sexuality is the name of who we are. Simultaneously, it
is the name of what most threatens us and what we most need to know.
To North Americans and Western Europeans at the end of the
twentieth century, these assertions will seem obvious and commonplace.
That sexuality is fundamental to human being--both as individual and as
species--will be taken as unproblematic. We are, essentially, sexual beings.
Sexuality is a fact. It is the basis of social interaction and the core of
individual identity. It poses a threat when its importance goes
unrecognized and its expressions are repressed. Therefore, we ought to
affirm our sexuality by calling upon it to speak, and we ought to manage
its more dangerous potentials through the transfonnative power of
confessional discourse. Tbe greater danger is silence. These assertions are
so obvious to most people that questioning them seems reactionary if not
insane. Repressed sexuality is self·destructive, debilitating, unhealthy;
confession is healthy, liberating, and self-affirmative. Who would doubt
these things?
Of course, if one is homosexual , confession's benefits also have
their price. One stands to lose one's job, one's horne, one's children, one's
medical insurance, one's civil rights, and (especially if one is under-aged
or institutionalized) one's physical self-determination and physiological
integrity. Sometimes that price seems so high that one does begin to
doubt; one begins to suspect that the demand for confession originates
someplace other than in adesire for liberation--or that the liberation
desired is liberation from, among other things, homosexuality.
Foucault for whatever reasons--maybe because he was
homosexual?--raises questions about the meaning and function of
confessional practice by questioning the reality of the repression it is
supposed to off-set. He argues that historical evidence does not support
the hypothesis of a general repression of sexuality in the nineteenth
century but, on the contrary, indicates an expansion of discourses and a
proliferation of discursive centers. Repression may have operated in
certain areas at certain times, but these silences were nothing compared
to the surrounding explosions of speech. General repression is not an
historical fact. Therefore, confession is not the liberation of a sexuality
that history and power have distorted and suppressed; it is not the doorway
through which the natural, untainted essence of human being will corne
forth.
What, then, is confession? And what is this sexuality that, in the
absence of general repression, insists on speaking so loudly about itself?
Undoubtedly, confessional practices employed in psychiatry,psychoanalysis,
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medieine, eriminology, and dozens of other disciplines do enable the
expression of something--but what? What is the sexuality that is
eompelled to eonfess itself in these discourses? And whence that
compulsion?
What is sexuality? This is Foucault's question. Implicit in it is
another question--what is homosexuality?--the question I naively asked at
the age of twelve, the question to whieh definitive answers have
unceasingly corne forth. But Foueault's question disrupts the grounds of
those definitive answers. When we move with this question into Foucault's
genealogical discourse, we undergo a shifting of the ground of questioning
itself. For, raised within an analysis eharaeterized by attention to history
and power, questions are transfonned, made new, whieh means there are
possibilities for new kinds of answers, answers that do not foreclose
thinking before it gets underway. Within genealogieal discourse, the
question becomes: What is sexuality (and in particular homosexuality), not
essentially, but diseursively and historieally?
Foueault's shifting of the ground of questioning is analogous to
that whieh oeeurs in seetion 3 of Nietzsehe's Prefaee to On the Genealogy
01Morals. There Nietzsehe writes that as a ehild he pondered the essence
and origin of evil. What is evil? From whence does it eorne? He
assumed that the answers to these questions would concern things that lay
"behind the world."2 Older and better edueated, however, he ceased to
assurne that evil is historieally transeendent, that the word "evil"refers to
something outside language and the history of human struggle and desire.
Tbe being and SOUfce of evil, he reasoned, is an historical matter, and the
answers--for there will be many answers--are to be found in the
vieissitudes of discourse and power. Tbe questions to ask are: What
powers speak in the word "evil"? Whose interests does the eoncept serve?
How does it function in different historical loeations? From what eoneepts
does it distinguish itself at what times? What are its immediate
predecessors? What contingencies allowed for the emergence of this term
in its euerent meanings and usages? Tbis shift from the transeendent to
the historical initiates Nietzsehean genealogy. It is a simple shift. It
requires only that one seek the meaning of words within rather than
outside language, only that one abandon the notion that words' true
meanings are their euerent referents and that one understand language as
thoroughly historieal. But the eonsequences of the. shift are far more
2Priedrich Nietzshe. On the Genealogy 0/ Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York:
Vintage Books, 1967), p. 17.
47
dramatic than the shift itself, and the fields opened by the questions it
enables are fertile and vast.
What is sexuality? How has sexuality eorne to be the truth of
human being? How is it that we have convinced ourselves that our
sexuality, our truth, has for two centuries now been repressed and that in
confessional practice our very freedorn is at stake? How did sexual
subjectivity corne to OO? These are Foucault's genealogical questions--the
questions 'that seemed to hold such promise for me when I first
encountered thern ten years ago, the questions that opened the doors of
possibility that every other sexual diseourse had elosed off, beginning witb
that conversation in tbe kitchen with my mother ten and a half years
before.
2. Sexual Subjectivity/Homosexual Subjectivity
By pointing out that sexuality is essentially epistemological (in that
it serves as an object of knowledge and a loeus of truth), Foueault very
clearly situates sexuality--all sexuality--in a problematics of coneealment
and disclosure. Sexuality is constituted from the beginning as that which
must be confessed; sexuality is, inherently, something hidden that must be
drawn out. The sexual subject ,therefore, is constituted, in its very essence,
as a eonfessing subject--whether its confession remains within the pages of
the individual's diary or becomes an item in the daily news. The sexual
subject confesses; the question is only what, when, where, and to whom.
Tbe sexual subject, then, is pervaded by epistemological concems;
every aspeet of its being is ordered by issues of truth and falsehood,
knowledge and ignorance. Its constant engagement with 'the dynamics of
the known and the unknown, the revealed and the concealed is the
defining feature of its existence. Thus, Foucault's analysis situates sexual
subjectivity--a11 sexual subjeclivity--in relation to what has corne to be
known as the "eloset. tt No matter what its individual nature, sexuality's
initial locus is a1ways a "eloset, " otherwise confession would have no
meaning. The sexuality Foucault describes is perpetually exhorted to
"come out," perpetually "coming out," and perpetually at risk of being
"outted." Thus homosexual subjectivity--the popular exemplar of botb
ttcloseted" and ttout U sexuality--is paradigmatic of sexual subjectivities of all
sorts.
Those who critieize Foucault for paying seant attention to
homosexuality overlook this crucial analytic move. Foucault does not make
homosexuality an explicit objecl of consideration in The Hislory 0/Sexuality
precisely because homosexuality is the subjeet of the entire discourse. Tbe
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subject position under investigation in this work is the subject constituted
in relation to the closet, which is culturally marked as a homosexual space.
One of the most central and perhaps radical claims in Foucaul!'s work is
that sexual subjeetivity in the twentieth century is eonstituted--regardless
of any individual's object choice or ttorientation"--in relation to a
homosexual subject position that was established in the nineteenth century.
In seetion 3 of this essay I will explore this claim.
Given this deseription of sexual subjectivity, Foueault'sanalysis is
likely to be espeeially compelling for a homosexual reader. One reads of
oneself, one's dilemmas, one's suspicions, one's pleasures, one's fears.
Perhaps for the first time, one reads of oneself not as deviant but as
exemplary. One can take a certain perverse pleasure in this inversion of
the normal order of things, but pleasure is not all a homosexual reader
may take from Foucault's analysis. Power (which to be sure offers some
pleasures of its own) is also to be had. As I will argue in the final section
of this essay, reeognition of the centrality of the homosexuaI subjeet can
be liberating and empowering for those who occupy that subjeet position.
3. Toward a Genealogy 0/ the Homosexual
Genealogies begin with the birth of the being to be accounted for.
They note the supporting conditions at the time--those that brought forth
the new creature and nurtured it--and then move back in history through
the ever-inereasing eontluences of eontingencies that engendered those
supporting conditions. If one were to set out to write a genealogy of the
homosexual , one would be drawn immediately to the last third of the
nineteenth cenlury when the word "homosexual tt first found its way into
language. Foucault suggests that "Westphal 's famous artiele of 1870 on
'eontrary sexual sensations' ean stand as its date of birth" (HS} 43). One
would note, then, that sexological discourse served as the matrix within
whieh the embryo germinated and was nourished. One would also note
two other facts: (1) the presenee of a targe number of other deviant sexual
identities--"Krafft-Ebing's zoophiles and zooerasts, Rohleder's auto-
monosexualists; and later, mixoseopophiles, gyneeomasts, presbyophiles,
sexoesthetic inverts, and dyspareunist wornen" (HSI 43)--and (2) the
absence of anything called "heterosexual. "
Given these observations, a genealogist would ask two broad
questions: (1) What were the events, conditions, discourses, or institutions
that enabled and supported a11 these reifications of sexual practiee,
including the homosexual , in the final third of the nineteenth century, and
(2) what were the events, conditions, diseourses, or institutions that
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nurtured the figure of the homosexual while allowing the deaths of its
myriad siblings? Here one might take the heterosexual's absence as a
elue.
Let us begin with the first question: What supported the
reifieation of sexual practices in the nineteenth eentury? Varieties of
sexual praetiee existed long before then. But late in the nineteenth century
suddenly what had been eoneeived aIong the axis of activity was
reeonceived along the axis of identity. Whereas the sodomite was but the
juridieal subjeet of forbidden aets (HSI 43), the homosexual (among
others) emerged as
a personage, a past, a ease history, and a ehildhood, in addition to
being a type of life, a life fonn, and a morphology, with an indiscreet
anatomy aod possibly a mysterious physiology. Nothing that went into
his total eomposition was unaffeeted by his sexuality. It was
everywhere present in him: at the root of all his actions because it was
their insidious and indefinitely active principle; written immodestly on
his face and body because it was a secret that always gave itself away.
(8S1 43)
Whereas the sodomite was an outlaw and a sinner, the homosexual was a
reified pathology; whereas the sodomite was an outlaw and a sinner
because of wbat he or she did, tbe homosexual was a patbology regardless
of anything he or she did or did not do.
As a IIcase," a pathology, the homosexual 's locus of emergence is
sexological diseourse, a branch of medical discourse, which by the
nineteenth century is a branch of the life sciences. The homosexual is a
child of biology and medicine. Therefore , careful examination ofthe
relation between sexualityand "a technology of health and pathology" (HS1
44) is crucial to the construction of a genealogy of homosexuality. This
examination will take us into Foueault's discussion of "biopower" (HSI
140). For it is within networks of biopower that sexuality is a matter of
healthy funetioning and that heaIth means normaIity and pathology
abnormality or devianee.
The genealogical account of biopower that Foucault offers is
complex and highly compressed in The History 0/ Se.xuality, Volume 1.
Nevertheless, an argument exists there in encapsulated form, its most
imponant premiss being the following: In the last quarter of the
eighteenth century an event of monumental importance occurred, "nothing
less than the entry of life into history" (HSl 141).
This entry occurred in two different realms. On the one hand, it
took place in the realm of discursive formation. Only at the end of the
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eighteentb century did tbe distinction between organie and inorganic beings
become established as a significant demarcation in scientific practice, and
only with tbis distinction were modem biological sciences born. As
Foucault writes in The Order 0/ Things,
Historians want to write histories of biology in the eighteenth century;
but they do not realize that biology did not exist then, and that the
pattern of knowledge that has been familiar to us for a hundred and
fifty years is not valid for a prevjous periode And that, jf biology was
unknown, there was a very simple reason for it: life itself did not exist.
All that existed was Iiving beings, which were viewed through a grid of
knowledge constituted by natural history.3
In fact tbe word "biology"did not enter scientific discourse until 1802.4
"Life"as we understand the term simply was not a scientific category prior
to the end of the eighteenth century. On the other band--and, Foucault
implies, more fundamentally (HSJ 143)--life emerges as the object of
disciplinary power. It is the organism--as a growing, reproducing
individual and as a member of a growing, reproducing population--that
becomes the object of power's advance.
Qnly with the concept of "the organism" is it possible for
disciplinary power to become normalizing power, biopower. In the
seventeentb and early eighteenth centuries, when bodies were conceived
of as collections of spatially-related parts, the purpose of discipline was to
smooth the interactions of those parts, to make movements more efficient,
to produce a bodythat functioned like a well-oiled machine. The concept
of "tbe organism, " however, allowed the introduction of the notions ot
temporality and development into disciplinary practice. An organism has
functional systems, cycles of growth and decline; hence, its parts stand not
in spatial relation, but primarily in temporal relation to one another. An
organie body is essentially a body in process.S
This shift in the conception of 'the body--from machine to
organism, from spatiality to temporality--marks tbe sbift trom mecbanical
disciplinary power to normalizing biopower. For only a temporal being
can be normal or abnormal. Norms always concern development--stages
JPoucault, 1he Ordero/Things (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), pp. 127-28.
4Nancy Stepan, lhe Idea 0/ Race in Science (London: Macmillan, 1982,p. 5.
'Foucault discusses this transmutation of disciplinary power in Discipline and Punish: The
Birth 0/ the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), pp. 155-56.
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of growth, of intellectual or moral attainment, of civilization. A being is
normal when it progresses through the requisite set of stages in the right
order at tbe right rate; a being is abnormal wben it fails to progress
through the stages inthe right order, when it regresses, when its
development is accelerated, retarded, or arrested at an early or
intermediate stage.
The objects of biopower and of biological science are the same
object--the organism. Tbe aims of the two disciplines are the same as
weil. Biological science aims to generate organic developmental norms in
order to devise ways of intervening in cases of abnormality. Similarly
biopower aims to administer the processes of life, to manage populations
and to discipline living individuals, which it does by generating
norms--often taken from biology--and by developing ways to intervene in
cases of abnormality. Biology and biopower are intimately connected.
By the end of the nineteenth century, medicine, which of course
partakes of a discursive and practical tradition far older than biology, was
securely framed within the discursive structure of the normalizing life
sciences. It was a thoroughly normalized medical discipline that enabled
tbe sub-fields of psychiatry and sexol~gy, disciplines which in their turn
produced "the homosexuaI. "
In these new medical discourses, "homosexuality" is a coinage
designating a specific type of abnormality, a specific deviation from a
developmental norm. One becomes homosexual because, somewhere
along one's developmental trajectory, the process of sexual maturation
veers away from the standards of organic functioning established by
medical science. Exactly what causes this deviation from the norm bas
a1ways been disputed. But what is important for Foucault's purposes and
for ours here is that the homosexual is formed from the beginning as an
essentially developmental subject whose developmental process has gone
awry. This may happen to anyone temporarily, but it becomes reified as
a pathology if the deviation constitutes a permanent arrest of the
developmental process. At that point, developmental deviation becomes
personal identity.
This way of understanding deviance characterizes
nineteenth-century sciences generally, from histology and embryology to
anthropology and incipient sociology, a11 of which posited temporal
progression, development, as a fundamental ontological category. But,
since processes in themselves are difficult to study, arrested processes are
essential for establishing a science of temporal unfolding. William Riply
and other teratologists assembled extensive collections of defonned fetuses
and stillbom animals and children, because by studying each stage in
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arrest, they hoped to leam about processes in their normal temporal flow.
Similarly, anthropologists sought to understand the rise of human
civilization by studying "primitive" groups, those whose civilized
development remained arrested at an early stage. Though it may seem
odd that sciences dedicated to the notion that temporal development is
ontologically fundamental would insist on reification of deviant categories,
in fact tbe practice of reification actually grounded those sciences'
developmental claims. Studies of reified deviants were necessary in order
to enable scientists to establish developmental norms.
The notion of arrested development in turn enabled technological
interventions in development. If the process of deviation itself could be
delineated, then scientists could, theoretically, intervene and force the
organism back onto anormal developmental pa'th. Intervention might
occur in the live.s of individuals--children might be saved from becoming
auto-monosexualists, for example--or in whole populations--races might be
purified and thus set on the road to progress. This was the promise of
nineteenth-century biological science, working hand in hand with social and
govemmental institutions of biopower.
And they did work hand in hand. Deviance seemed rampant, but
scientists, bureaucrats, technicians, and social reformers all promised
frightened constituents that someday it would be eradicated. TItey held
that deviance was a threat to all good citizens and even to the future of
civilization itself; degeneration of families, races, and the entire species
loomed. But there was hope. Better living through eugenies became the
scientific, bureaucratic, and political order of the day.
However, if elimination of deviance was the aim of normalizing
technologies, why did deviants--like homosexuals--remain? Foucault gives
an implicit answer when he discusses the campaign against masturbation.
"What appears, tf he writes, "is an cffort at elimination that was always
destined to faH and always constrained to begin again" (HSI 41). Tbe
effort to eliminate deviance establishes social structures and discourses that
produce so much power (and pleasure), that in the end it is no more than
a cover for tbe exercise and extension of bio-political networks. The effort
to eliminate continues, then, only as a rose.
What this actually entailed, throughout this whole secular campaign
that mobilized the adult world around the sex of children, was using
these tenuous pleasures as a prop, constituting them as secrets (that
iSt forcing them inta hiding so as to make possible their discovery),
tracing them back to their source, tracking them from their origins to
their effects, searching out everything that might cause them or simply
enable them to exist. ... The child's "vicen was not so much an enemy
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as a support.... Always relying on Ibis suppon~ power expanded~
subdivided~ and branehed out. ... In appearanee we are dealing with a
barrier system; but in fact, all around the child, indefinite lines of
penetration were disposed.
(HSl 42)
Deviance had--and still has--at least two functions: (1) to enable the study
and establishment of "normality," and (2) to justify nonnalization of
multiple sectors of a population. These two functions are inseparable from
one another.
We may conclude, then, that among the conditions supporting
reification of sexual practices in the nineteenth century, of greatest
importance was the existence of power/knowledge regimes grounded in
the notion of normed organie development. Reified sexual pathologies are
unthinkable apart from discourses of development, maldevelopment, and
developmental deviance and arrest, and they are invaluable within them as
sources of new knowledge about development's nonnal processes.
Further, in addition to serving as sources of knowledge, reified pathologies
serve as targets for nonnalization, as the raison d'etre for bio-political
intervention in the lives of individuals and social groups.
We are now in a position to address the second genealogical
question raised at 'lhe beginning of the present section: Why did the figure
of the homosexual remain long after the other reified sexualities Foucault
mentions suffered their demise? Foucault does not give an explicit answer,
since he does not make the homosexual the object of his essay, but his
work suggests at least one hypothesis .
For bo'th analytic and political purposes, normalizing disciplines
require deviance, but not a11 kinds of deviance serve disciplinary purposes
equally weil. Deviance to which few people are prone is of little
use--because study of such subjects teIls scientists Httte about society as a
whole and because deviance that is not within the realm of most
individuals ' experience cannot serve as justification for regulating most
individuals ' behavior. While probably no one ever actually formulated the
plan to regulate people's lives by inventing deviance and then frightening
them with stories of it, it is a fact that (1) homosexuals do frighten
people6--more than, for example, shoe fetishists or sheep-Iovers; (2)
6As Eve Kosofsky Sedgwiek notes in Epistemology 0/ the eloset, Ithomosexual panie tt has
beeome a legal defense strategy for heterosexual men who assault gay men. Tbe defense
resls on the notion lhat many straight men are so afraid of homosexual advances, because
they fear they may respond favorably to thern at some level, that physieal assault of the
person alleged to have made advances is understandable. See Epistemology 0/ the elostt
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homophobia is eonstantly reinforeed in seientifie and political discourse;
and (3) homophobia makes people vulnerable to manipulation.
Homosexuality, far more than other sexual deviations that were reified in
the nineteenth eentury, implicated large sectors of the population and
thereby enabled (partly by creating popular desire for) widespread
regulation, manipulation, and control. Homosexuality proved to be very
useful to disciplinary regimes.
Eve Sedgwick writes of the tension that exists in our society
.between what she ealls the "minoritizing view" of homosexuality and the
"universaJizing view. ,,7 On the one hand, homosexuality affects a minority
of the population, beeause it is the eondition (or nature) of a small group
of people--somewhere between two and ten pereent of uso Onthe other
hand, homosexuaJity affects everyone, because it is that which most people
seek not to be defined as, that against which most people define
themselves, and that which their sexuality always threatens to become. On
the one hand, onlya few deviants are homosexual; on the other, anyone
may turn out to be homosexual at any time. There is a conceptual gulf
between homosexuality and heterosexuality, and at the same time they
partake of the same conceptual arrangements; they are symbiotic. This
tension is a key to understanding how diseiplinary regimes structure and
use homosexuality.
Heterosexuality, the nonn, is a construct that did not exist prior
to the conceptualization of homosexuality, but the two taken together are
now believed--by most Americans at least--to exhaust the sexualities of the
human species. He who is not heterosexual is homosexual, and vice versa.
The norm has been established in opposition to the deviation, but that
deviation is feared in part because anyone might slip into it. Thus it
functions as a meehanism for controlling every individual in modern
Western society. Those who are homosexual are eompelled to confess and
endure punishment or to spend Iife in silence and emotional exile from
their families, neighbors, and eolleagues. Those who are not homosexual
are eompelled to eonfess that they are not or to endure the punishments
inflicted upon those who are. One must prove oneself sexually normal or
be branded a queer--which is precisely the reason that homosexual
deviance is so valuable to our society and why it remains when alt its
perverted kinspeople have died away: It is effective in disciplining entire
(Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 1990), p. 19.
7Sedgwick, p. 1.
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populations, whereas other, less binary-prone categories, do not afford that
possibility to as great an extent. Homosexual deviance disciplines not just
homosexuals, but everyone. The figure of the homosexual is the perfect
tool of normalizing power.
What is a homosexual . then? A homosexual is an
historico-discursive construct arising with biologico-political networks of
power; one very important reason it is retained is that it enables the
management of a variety of sectors of the sexual population--in part by
defining them, in part by punishing them, and in part by frightening them
of society at Iarge, their loved ones, and themselves. Over the hundred
and twenty years sißce tbe homosexual became aspecies, it has been
refigured in many ways, botb by the' administrative networks that
supposedly seek to eliminate or manage it and by those who instantiate the
category. Its exact definition, not just its value or legitimacy, has always
been in dispute. Nevertheless, as Sedgwick forcefully argues,
homosexuality and homophobia are fundamental organizing principles in
our sexual and anthropological discourses and the disciplinary practices
that accompany them. And, I would argue, homosexuality's conceptual
instability is what malees it so strategically useful for disciplinary regimes.
Far from being mere marginal characters ever threatened with annihilation
by a homophobic society, homosexuals are central figures in a complex
system of biopower that aims to administer sexually saturated, docile
populations.
This is not to say individual homosexual people are not harassed,
beaten, excluded from jobs and insurance programs, killed, and erased
from cultural history . Clearly our society, both formally and informally,
discriminates agaißst and attempts to silence, injure, and even eliminate
individual homosexual people daily. However, though these
anti-homosexual social mechanisms look like a barrier system, as Foucault
says about the mechanisms established ostensibly to prevent masturbation,
they function like a system of incitement: they force homosexuality into
elosets so it can be tracked down and discovered or confessed; they enable
the creation of lines of penetration into individuals' lives; tbey incite
discourse; and, most importantly, they maintain sexuality as an
epistemological issue, as a question of truth.
4. Genealogy and fts A/termath
If one were to set out to write a genealogy of the homosexual, one
would surely write something very like The History 0/ Sexuality, Volume 1.
Just as Nietzsche's book offered a genealogieal answer to the question of
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morality, Foucault's book offers a genealogical answer to the question of
sexuality. In Nietzsche's genealogy, evil--that which morality supposedly
seeks to eradicate..-functions as the central support for moral disciplinary
regimes. Similarly, in Foucault's genealogy, the closet....the hiddenness that
sexual discourses supposedly seek to penetrate and thereby
discard--functions as tbe central support for sexual disciplinary regimes.
As we undergo the genealogical movement of Foucault's text, as
the inevitability of our sexual identities comes to seem more and more
questionable, rigid sexual categories lose their power to form us and to
shape our understanding of the world. Some of us may experience this
from the beginning as freeing. But for others, destabilization of the modes
of thought that define us might weil cause fear, anger, or a sense of
humiliation. It is bad enough, perhaps, to be labelIed deviant, immoral, or
sick; but Foucault's label may be even worse, because Foucault is
suggesting that we are products, "instrument effects" (HSI 48) of the
powers that oppress us, its weapons. He is suggesting that we participate
in our own oppression and that the means we have developed to combat
it-..naming ourselves, speaking of our sexuality and our lives..-may provide
further support for those powers. This genealogy implicates us.
Why, then, do I find it so exciting? Tbe answer is simple. If one
is implicated, one is not powerless. Foucault's answer to the question
"what is a homosexual?" opens toward creative possibility, toward choice.
There is nothing inevitable about the current epistemological and sexual
arrangements in our society. There is nothing inevitable about anyone's
participation in those arrangements. And, if I occupy a position that
serves as a support for an entire oppressive system, myacts of disroption
in that position may destabilize that system. Hy pointing out the centrality
ofhomosexual subjectivity in regimes ofsexual power/knowledge, Foucault
points to homosexual subjects as powerful actors in determining the future
of those power/knowledge regimes.
Foucault once said,
Maybe the target nowadays is nol to discover what we are, but to
refusc what we arc. Wc havc (0 imaginc and to build up what we could
be to gel rid of this kind of 'double·bind,' which is the simultaneous
individualization and totalizalion of modem power structures.8
8Poucaull. "Aftcrword: Thc Subject and Power, "in Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism
and Hermeneutics, 2nd ed., cd. Hubcrt L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (Chicago: Univcrsity
of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 216.
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This genealogy of homosexuality opens onto a whole realm of new
questions: What do we want to be? How can we destabilize the powers
that depend on us? What modes of disruption will serve to alter the
meanings of the practices we engage in? How can we incite the disruption
of heterosexual categories. practices. and meanings? Unlike
non-genealogical discourses• Foucault·s attempt to answer the question
"What is a hOßlosexual?" makes creative thinking possible. opens
questioning rather than foreclosing it.
Some might fear that genealogical thinking--assuming, as it does,
that categories are historically constructed and insisting, as it does, on
freedom--will lead to a rejection of homosexuality as a choice or to a
demand that homosexual individuals simply choose heterosexuality. On
the contrary, in the space of genealogy, neither the repression of
homosexuality nor the strengthening of heterosexual norms is possible.
Repression is merely an instrument of confessional power, and
heterosexuality is a fragile concept thoroughly dependent for its meaning
on homosexuality; heterosexuality, and therefore heterosexism, are at least
as destabilized in this genealogical discourse as homosexuality is. Foucault
does not join the chorus exhorting us to leave the eloset, but he does not
push us back into the eloset either. Foucault's genealogy explodes the
closet--and leaves us with an open future.
It is tme that the self-overcoming movement of Foucault's
genealogy undermines the very homosexual subject who informs and
structures it, insofar as that subject maintains itself in an insistence upon
its ahistoricity. That is the nature of Nietzschean genealogy; it leaves no
transcendent essences intaet. But in the end, genealogy gives far more
than it takes away. In the end, it gives us ourselves, for it gives us the
freedorn "to imagine ... what we could be."
University of Richmond
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